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Abstract
Vehicle-related flood fatalities and rescues due to driving through floodwater are a significant emergency
management issue for emergency services. To reduce fatalities, injuries, and costs associated with this
risky driving behaviour it is essential to develop strategies to stop or reduce the incidence of people
driving through floodwater. In Australia, people are told not to enter floodwater – on foot or in vehicles –
with the phrase ‘If it's flooded, forget it’ widely used in official messaging. As first responders responsible
for floods, storms and tsunamis, Australian State Emergency Service (SES) personnel are working in flood
conditions regularly and are considered an occupationally ‘at-risk’ group for driving through floodwater.
Although SES agencies across states and territories in Australia are independently led, they typically
promote policies of not entering floodwater to their personnel. Such policies are important for meeting
duty of care obligations to employees, for protection of assets (vehicles and equipment), and for
upholding organisational reputation (leading by example). This study was undertaken to explore the
behaviour of driving through floodwater by SES personnel. The study explored the characteristics of those
who have and have not driven through floodwater, and then used detailed situations in which SES
personnel entered floodwater in vehicles to analyse their perception of risks, the conditions and contexts
in which they entered floodwater, and to identify what influenced their decision to enter...
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A B S T R A C T

Vehicle-related ﬂood fatalities and rescues due to driving through ﬂoodwater are a signiﬁcant emergency management
issue for emergency services. To reduce fatalities, injuries, and costs associated with this risky driving behaviour it is
essential to develop strategies to stop or reduce the incidence of people driving through ﬂoodwater. In Australia, people are told not to enter ﬂoodwater – on foot or in vehicles – with the phrase ‘If it's ﬂooded, forget it’ widely used in
ofﬁcial messaging. As ﬁrst responders responsible for ﬂoods, storms and tsunamis, Australian State Emergency Service
(SES) personnel are working in ﬂood conditions regularly and are considered an occupationally ‘at-risk’ group for driving through ﬂoodwater. Although SES agencies across states and territories in Australia are independently led, they
typically promote policies of not entering ﬂoodwater to their personnel. Such policies are important for meeting
duty of care obligations to employees, for protection of assets (vehicles and equipment), and for upholding
organisational reputation (leading by example). This study was undertaken to explore the behaviour of driving
through ﬂoodwater by SES personnel. The study explored the characteristics of those who have and have not driven
through ﬂoodwater, and then used detailed situations in which SES personnel entered ﬂoodwater in vehicles to analyse their perception of risks, the conditions and contexts in which they entered ﬂoodwater, and to identify what inﬂuenced their decision to enter.
Following an earlier systematic literature review, a detailed online questionnaire was developed and administered to
SES personnel from a single agency. Data from 670 respondents indicated that 54.8% had driven through ﬂoodwater in
the previous two years, and a number of differences in the proﬁle of those who had/had not driven through ﬂoodwater
were identiﬁed. Those more likely to have driven through ﬂoodwater included males, volunteer personnel with longer
lengths of service, those doing more driving hours per week, those deployed to work in ﬂood conditions, and those
with current ﬂood rescue qualiﬁcations. The location type, water depth, and water velocity were conditions that contributed more to perception of risk at the time personnel drove through the ﬂoodwater. Detailed information about an
experience of entering ﬂoodwater was obtained from 201 respondents who had driven through ﬂoodwater in SES vehicles, and six factors relating to the decision to drive through ﬂoodwater were extracted. ‘Organisational training and
safety’, ‘External locus of control’ and ‘Absence of risk signals’ were identiﬁed as having the greatest inﬂuence on risk
perception leading to decisions to drive through ﬂoodwater. The ﬁndings of the study have a number of practical implications for the improvement of occupational safety management; such as upgrading risk assessments strategies,
reviewing workplace health and safety policies, enhancing training, increasing skills and knowledge of emergency services personnel about ﬂoodwater hazard situations, and improving internal ﬂood risk communication.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).

1. Introduction
People entering ﬂoodwater in vehicles is a leading cause of ﬂoodrelated drowning deaths globally [1–7]. In Australia, driving through
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ﬂoodwater is a common ﬂood experience for people [8]. Recent
Australian ﬂood fatality data showed that at least 96 deaths occurred in
74 incidents between 2001 and 2017 due to ﬂood-related vehicle accidents
with a mean of 1.3 fatalities per incident and the mean death toll across the
study time period was 5.7 fatalities per year [9]. According to post-mortem
reports, drowning was identiﬁed as the primary medical cause of death in
66% of the recorded fatalities (n = 96) and 24% occurred due to injury
while drowning [9]. State Emergency Service (SES) agencies in Australia
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ﬂoodwater has been deadly. It also enables us to compare the circumstances
in which our SES personnel cohort had driven through ﬂoodwater.
International ﬂood fatality research involving vehicles suggests that incorrect assessment of ﬂood conditions [3,15] and underestimating risks
[3,16,60] leads drivers to make inaccurate decisions which can lead to
fatal incidents. Flood conditions are typically described in research using
the following categories: ﬂoodwater characteristics (water ﬂow and
depth), roadway characteristics (location, road type, crossing type), vehicle
characteristics (vehicle type and operation, e.g. four-wheel drive (4WD))
and environmental circumstances (weather, lighting). Floodwater characteristics such as depth and ﬂow are primary inﬂuencers of vehicle (in)stability, and have been described in recent research [17]. Research on vehicle
stability in ﬂoodwater describes a three-phase process; of ﬂoating, sinking
and submersion [18]. Research has demonstrated that the ﬂoating phase
may last only 30 to 120 s, followed by the sinking phase, which is typically
completed within 2 to 4 min of contact with the water [18,19]. Research
into the dynamics of vehicles in ﬂoodwater has found that in fast-ﬂowing
ﬂoodwater of 3 m per second or greater, it can take just 15 cm of ﬂoodwater
for a small vehicle to become unstable, and only 30 cm for four-wheel drive
(4WDs) vehicles [20]. Vehicles may enter ﬂoodwater upright, or roll due to
rapid ﬂow [20].
The risks associated with driving through ﬂoodwater may also be determined by the characteristics of the location [3,16] and roadway characteristics such as road structure type; roadway side barriers; road side
topography; downstream depths adjacent to the roadway; signage; warning
systems; lighting; road pavement; road alignment; road grade; speed restrictions; trafﬁc volume, presence of road side markers and curb and guttering [21]. Vehicle characteristics like vehicle size, type, or operational
drive control may also give drivers conﬁdence in their ability which may
minimise the sense of risk [22].
One recent study [9] rigorously explored the circumstances of recent
vehicle-related deaths in Australia, to help understand the ﬂood conditions
associated with vehicle-related ﬂood fatalities. This research reported that
the shallowest water depth responsible for one fatal incident was only
20 cm. Almost two thirds of fatalities (63%) included reports of very fast
ﬂowing and rapidly rising ﬂoodwater, and most victims (87%) were
attempting to cross creeks, low bridges or causeways. Much smaller proportions (4%) occurred at a ford or weir, or on a normal stretch of (ﬂooded)
road. Regarding the environmental conditions, the largest proportion of fatalities occurred in the evening and night when it was dark (50%) and in the
incidents that occurred at night, all reported an absence of adequate street
lighting.

devote signiﬁcant time and money to rescuing people who have intentionally driven through ﬂoodwater in vehicles each year. One research study
[10] conducted following ﬂash ﬂoods in the Hunter Valley (120 km north
of Sydney) on 8–9th June 2007 reported that, of the 36 rescues in the SES
dataset, 13 (36%) were rescuing people from vehicles. Information sourced
from the NSW SES website to the end of September 2016 indicates that
nearly 550 ﬂood rescues have been performed by NSW SES in 2016 alone
[11]. During the ﬂooding of June 2016, NSW SES performed 300 ﬂood rescues, approximately a third of which involved rescuing people from ﬂooded
vehicles [11]. It is a signiﬁcant emergency management challenge for SES
personnel to perform potentially life-threatening and costly rescue operations for vehicle-related incidents during ﬂoods each year, and for SES
agencies to communicate the dangers to the public to reduce the incidence
of this risky driving behaviour.
Generally, the nature of SES personnel's work in ﬂood and storm contexts demands that they make quick and safe decisions under time pressure
and changing conditions. This places them among the top of those professions who work in natural hazard-related emergency settings, in terms of
balancing their own safety with their duty. Working in hazardous situations
with vehicles in ﬂood conditions engages these emergency workers in a potentially complex combination of risk scenarios. They must arrive quickly at
the emergency scene, at any time of the day or night. Incidents may be located in remote and difﬁcult to access areas (mountainous or hilly areas,
bridge or river crossings with rapid, rising ﬂoodwater), with changing
and sometimes extremely difﬁcult weather conditions (heavy rain and
wind), and with unknown road conditions (road grade, road pavement integrity, or road alignment under water). A recent study in Australia [12] explored the lived experience of emergency service workers who undertake
ﬂood rescues of those who have driven into ﬂoodwater. This interviewbased study identiﬁed four challenges: involvement of untrained personnel;
varying information provided by emergency telephone operators; behaviour of drivers complicating the rescue; and people sightseeing ﬂoods or
ﬂood rescues or ignoring closed roads providing rescuers with sources of
distraction and frustration.
In general SES agencies rely on safety management practices and interventions to encourage their personnel to avoid ﬂoodwater risks, yet there is
no evidence available to know whether personnel adhere to these inﬂuences or if they are obliged to follow these safety policies as part of their
role. SES in the state of Victoria (VICSES) has recently developed operational doctrine to support personnel in assessing and managing the risk associated with encountering ﬂoodwater in VICSES vehicles [13]. In
addition, in revising its values, VICSES members agreed to incorporate
‘Safety Drives Our Decisions’ to reﬂect the importance of safety to the organisation, and this was rated as one of the highest of their ﬁve organisational
values [14]. Still it is important to acknowledge that because of the service
they provide, the organisation may never be able to create a regulation to
reduce risk to zero and stop its personnel from ever driving through ﬂoodwater. However, this issue needs to be addressed as a matter of priority, as it
relates to occupational health and safety risks for this emergency service
group. To reduce the costs of physical damage to vehicles and other assets,
to protect personnel's lives, there is an urgent need to understand the real
experiences of SES personnel who have encountered and driven through
ﬂoodwater and the decisions that directed their actions. Thus, the aims of
the current study are to explore SES personnel's experiences of driving
through ﬂoodwater in SES vehicles; to see the differences between those
who had driven through and who did not, to explore their perception of
risks of a recalled incident of driving through ﬂoodwater, to identify what
inﬂuenced their decision-making to drive through, and to test whether
there is an association between their perceived level of risks and decisionmaking factors.

1.2. Concepts from theories
To understand the behaviour and underlying decision-making processes
of driving through ﬂoodwater by emergency services in occupational situations, the present study developed a conceptual framework based on psychological theories. To address the behavioural and cognitive thinking
aspects, the study adopted concepts from two theories to help understand
behaviour, which had not been applied previously in driving through ﬂoodwater research. These theories are the Recognition Primed DecisionMaking Model (RPD) and the Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM).
1.2.1. The Recognition Primed Decision-Making Model (RPD)
Naturalistic decision-making research has shown that experienced people under pressure in complex situations do not generally use the classical
approach to decision-making [23]. Under these circumstances, people
tend to operate in a manner depicted by the recognition-primed decision
(RPD) model [61]. RPD model development evolved from ﬁeld observations and interviews with ﬁre ﬁghters, neonatal intensive care nurses, surgeons, weather forecasters, military ﬁeld commanders and pilots. Thus,
the context for the research was situations that are circumstancedependent and may be subject to rapid change which appears to be a
good ﬁt with emergency workers' situations in natural hazard events. As described by Klein et al. [[24]], the process involves a decision-maker

1.1. Vehicle-related ﬂood fatality research
Consideration of ﬂood fatality research literature is important for helping to understand the circumstances in cases where driving through
2
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1.3. Conceptual framework for the current study

noticing situation-generated cues, recognising patterns formed by the cues
(based on experience), focussing on a potential solution or ‘action script,’
and imagining potential outcomes of action implementation. The latter involves experience again in the form of the decision-maker's mental model of
the overall operations. If the imagined outcome is ‘good enough,’ then the
action is implemented. In short, the RPD process highlights three simple
steps: experiencing the situation, analysing the situation, and implementing
the decision.
The current study utilised the RPD model approach to help conceptualise the decision-making process for emergency service personnel in ﬂood
situations. In these situations, they need to form a risk assessment based
on synthesis of a number of contextual and conditional components.

Supported by the previous research ﬁndings and theories just outlined,
the present study uses the following conceptual framework as a model for
the decision-making process of driving through ﬂoodwater for this emergency service occupational group (Fig. 1).
Similar to the RPD process, the model (Fig. 1) proposes the steps of
decision-making including: experiencing the situation, analysing the situation, mental simulation of action, and implementing the decision into behaviour. Supported by ﬁndings from previous review papers [1,36] the
model proposes risk perception as the core aspect of the decision-making
process to take the decision to drive through ﬂoodwater.
The model features perception of risk determined by two components:
risk assessment factors and inﬂuences on decision-making. Risk assessment
informs risk perception through evaluating the physical characteristics of
the context and the environment, and a number of socio-cognitive factors
inﬂuence decision-making to guide risk processing and inform risk perception. After initial mental simulation of the action, the ﬁnal steps of the
decision-making process include two processes from the EPPM model: protection motivation (danger control process), and defensive motivation (fear
control). The outcome of these two processes leads into the ﬁnal decision
being formed, which is then implemented into behaviour.

1.2.2. The Extended Parallel Process Model (EPPM)
EPPM is one of the major theories within the domain of psychological
research on health behaviour. Research using EPPM covers a large number
of health-related topics such as drug abuse [25], but EPPM has also been
used in vehicle-related behaviour, e.g. driver safety [26] and driver fatigue
[27]. However, studies applying EPPM to natural hazards situations have
not been identiﬁed to date. The EPPM posits that when presented with a
risk message, individuals engage in the following outcomes via two appraisal processes: danger control process and fear control process [28]:

2. Methods

• Outcome I: Danger Control—People take protective action against the
threat.
• Outcome II: Fear Control—People in denial about threat react against it.
• Outcome III: Lesser Amount of Danger Control—People take some protective action, but are not motivated to do much.
• Outcome IV: No Response—People do not consider the threat to be real or
relevant to them, or are often not even aware of the threat.

2.1. Study design and procedure
The study was administered using the online platform Survey Monkey.
The Macquarie University Human Research Ethics Committee granted ethical approval for this study on 12th September 2017 (Reference number:
5201700133). Participation was voluntary, with all participants ensured
conﬁdentiality and anonymity of responses prior to commencing. Participants were recruited via an email from the SES Deputy Commissioner endorsing the study, which was sent to all personnel. This email was
distributed when the study opened on the 16th July 2018 and a reminder
email was sent one week prior to the study closing date, which was the
13th of August 2018.

1.2.3. Psychological research applied to driving though ﬂoodwaters
Previous research has provided a body of emerging evidence of the psychological factors that inﬂuence individuals' decisions to drive through
ﬂoodwater [29,30,62] including past experience, attitudes, social pressure,
self-efﬁcacy beliefs, and risk perceptions. Regarding the latter, the severity
of the risk has been shown to have an effect on reducing drivers' willingness
to enter ﬂoodwater [30].
Building on this previous research, Hamilton and colleagues have recently conducted a series of studies using qualitative, mixed method, and
experimental designs to better understand the inﬂuences on individuals' beliefs and intentions to drive, and avoid driving, through ﬂoodwater
[31–34]. It is important to understand the differences in beliefs guiding behavioural alternatives (i.e. intentionally driving through, or avoiding driving through, ﬂoodwater) as there is research to suggest that performing
and not performing a given behaviour are not conceptual opposites. Different motivational pathways may operate in guiding individuals' decisions to
engage (or avoid engaging) in an action or behaviour [35]. Findings from
two qualitative studies [32,34] investigating the beliefs inﬂuencing drivers'
decisions to drive and avoid driving through ﬂoodwaters are presented
below.
In a study exploring driver decisions through the lived experience, Hamilton, Peden, Keech & Hagger [32] identiﬁed four overarching themes that
emerged from drivers' descriptions of factors that inﬂuenced their decision
to drive into ﬂoodwaters. These were past experience, individual factors,
the social and environmental context, and self-efﬁcacy judgements. In a second study investigating the psychological inﬂuences underpinning decisions to avoid driving through ﬂoodwater, Hamilton et al. [34] identiﬁed
three overarching themes. Based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour
(TPB) belief-based framework, drivers' descriptions of factors that inﬂuenced their decision to avoid driving through ﬂoodwaters were linked to
their behavioural beliefs, e.g. safety ﬁrst and foremost, their normative beliefs, e.g. think of the rescuers, and their control beliefs, e.g. that the destination wasn't that important.

2.2. Participants
A non-random convenience sample of SES personnel (N = 670) was recruited via email. The average age range of the respondents was
45–54 years. The majority of respondents (77.1%, n = 517) were over
35 years of age, with just over two thirds being male (67.9%, n = 455). Volunteer personnel made up the majority of the sample (89.1%, n = 597),
and most (80.6%, n = 540) had held a full driving licence for >10 years.
The majority (91.5%, n = 184,) had experience of deployment to local
ﬂood events. Almost three quarters (73.1%, n = 490) had received ﬂood
rescue training to a minimal level of qualiﬁcation. Participants had received
a range of other relevant training experience with over three quarters
(78.1%, n = 157) receiving general operational driver training and just
under half (48.8%, n = 98) receiving four-wheel drive vehicle training.
2.3. Measures
The behaviour of interest in this study is the act of driving through
ﬂoodwater by SES personnel driving an SES vehicle, i.e. the person in command of the vehicle. The term ﬂoodwater was deﬁned based on a deﬁnition
provided by the Australian Government Department of Geoscience
Australia [63]: “an overﬂowing of water onto land that is normally dry
and is not limited to roads”. This study employed a more driving- and
road-speciﬁc deﬁnition that was agreed in consultation with SES project ofﬁcers before the study so that it would be relevant to personnel.
Participants received the deﬁnition of ﬂoodwater in the following way.
“Currently, there is no clear deﬁnition of ﬂoodwater. For the purposes
of this survey, we will deﬁne ﬂoodwater as an environment with:
3
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Fig. 1. Conceptual decision-making model of driving through ﬂoodwater for emergency service personnel.

1. Water across the road surface.
2. Little to no visibility of the road surface markings under the water
(i.e., uncertain of road quality/integrity and possibly depth).
3. Water on normally dry land – ﬂowing or still

road type (major, minor/suburban, sealed, unsealed, causeway) and type of
crossing (a low-water crossing, bridge, or causeway, a ford or weir, a normal stretch of road) as spatial variables to explore how these variables inﬂuenced the decisions taken.

Based on the ﬂoodwater deﬁnition above…”
After this deﬁnition was presented, participants were asked three questions; How many times they had driven through ﬂoodwater in the last two
years in an SES vehicle - as a driver, how many times they had been driven
through ﬂoodwater in an SES vehicle - as a passenger, and how many times
they had driven through ﬂoodwater in their own private vehicles - as a
driver (responses were Never, 1–2 times, 3–6 times, >6 times). Then the respondents were asked “Can you recall an event in which you drove (or were
driven) through ﬂoodwater in an SES vehicle - ideally the most memorable
occasion in the last few years?”. The objective was to explore their experiences of entering ﬂoodwater in SES vehicles.

2.3.1.3. Environmental characteristics. Environmental components, such as
time of day, lighting conditions, and weather have been found to inﬂuence
both the cognitive process of ﬂoodwater hazard identiﬁcation on roads and
decision-making [16]. It has been hypothesised that drivers at night/in
dark conditions are either not able to see ﬂooded roads and possibly enter
ﬂoodwater by accident [5], or they are not able to assess the depth and velocity of water due to poor visibility [16]. To identify the environmental
variables in this study, time of day (lighting conditions (daylight, dark daylight, dawn/dusk, night with streetlight, night with no streetlight)) and
weather conditions (clear, overcast, light rain, steady rain, heavy rain)
were assessed.

2.3.1. Exploratory variables
In addition to a range of demographic variables, the questionnaire included the following contextual variables, linked to the speciﬁc incident
of driving through ﬂoodwater that they had recalled, to measure risk assessment factors, decision-making inﬂuences, and level of perceived risk associated with the recalled incident of driving through ﬂoodwater.

2.3.1.4. Floodwater characteristics during incident. Previous studies have
found that water characteristics such as water depth, water ﬂow, and presence of debris or mud have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on driver's decision making
to enter ﬂoodwater. Floodwaters can submerge vehicles or sweep them
away. Motorists may enter ﬂoodwaters unexpectedly [15] or ﬁnd themselves in circumstances where ﬂoodwaters rise around their vehicle [40].
In the present study, the variable water depth at the time of the driving incident was measured using a 6-point categorical scale grouped as A. “Less
than 15 cm”, B. “15 cm to 30 cm”, C. “30 cm to 45 cm”, D. “45 cm to
60 cm”, E. “60 cm to 95 cm”, and F. “Greater than 95 cm”. To reduce inconsistency in their estimations of the depth of each category level, participants
were provided with an image as a reference with the instruction that ‘water
heights are shown against a sedan - to help estimate the depth’ (Fig. 2). The
present study also included water ﬂow as a variable to understand the

2.3.1.1. Key factors of risk assessment. To measure the key factors of risk assessment the following variable categories were included in this study:
2.3.1.2. Spatial characteristics. Previous research on ﬂood fatalities in
Australia has focused on geographical locations [8,10,37–39], road characteristics [21], residential location of drowning victim, and the remoteness
of the incidents [39] as important factors for ﬂood fatalities. The present
study included location type (urban, suburban, regional, rural and remote);
4
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Fig. 2. Image provided in the survey as a reference for depth of water driven through.

▪ Age, in categories, ranging from 18 to 75 or older
▪ Gender, in categories, male, female, rather not say
▪ Years holding full driving licence, with response categories ranging
from “0 (still Provisional/Learner status)” to “More than 10 years”
▪ Average number of hours driving each week, with categories ranging
from “less than 2 hours”, to “15 or more hours”
▪ Years' experience as a paid, or unpaid SES member, with responses ranging from “Less than one year” to “More than 20 years”
▪ Current qualiﬁcations in Flood Rescue, with responses ranging from
“Yes, Flood Rescue Awareness” to “No, I have no Flood Rescue Qualiﬁcations”
▪ The respondents were asked “Do you get deployed to work in ﬂood/
storm conditions?” with responses options “Yes” or “No”.
▪ Frequency of driving SES vehicles, with responses ranging from
“Rarely” to “All the time”

characteristics of water in drivers' decision-making (still, slow, medium/
moderate, rapid/swift ﬂow).
2.3.1.5. Vehicle characteristics. Research in Australia which explored the
types of vehicles driven through ﬂoodwater, found that they varied considerably in size and type [22]. In a study [39], rates of non-aquatic transport
ﬂood related drownings per 100,000 registered vehicles were calculated
using Australian vehicle registration data. The vehicle types used in that
study [39] were - passenger vehicles (car, four-wheel drives (4WD)), light
commercial vehicles (utilities), rigid trucks (heavy vehicles, machinery)
and motorcycles (motorbikes, All Terrain Vehicles (ATVs)). For emergency
response in operational situations, SES is well equipped with vehicles suited
to their work. However, SES personnel also drive work passenger vehicles,
as well as their own private vehicles in the context of their work, e.g. in day
to day situations, travelling to/from duty and deployments. In consultation
with SES, the study included vehicle types representative of all SES vehicles, e.g. medium/heavy truck, light truck/dual cab, passenger vehicle,
and other types of SES vehicles (SUV, Ute etc.). Vehicle operation (allwheel drive, four-wheel drive, and two-wheel drive) was also included separately to capture the potential inﬂuence of the ability of the vehicle (as
well as size) on the driver's willingness to drive through ﬂoodwater [29].

2.4. Approach to analysis
All data analysis was conducted using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 25). Both non-parametric (chi-square, k-means cluster
analyses and principal component analyses for factor analyses) and

2.3.1.6. Inﬂuences on decision-making. The study used a list of 18 potential
inﬂuences to explore socio-cognitive and other potential inﬂuences on
drivers' decision-making processes. These included environmental cues, individual attitudes and situational contexts (e.g. journey characteristics), efﬁcacy responses, social inﬂuences, past experience, familiarity with road
and place, organisational safety attitude and professional skills and knowledge. The items (see Table 1) were based on the ﬁndings of previous research [1,31]. Respondents were asked the extent to which these 18
aspects inﬂuenced their decision to drive through the ﬂoodwater on this occasion. A 7-point Likert scale of response choices was used, ranging from
(1) not at all to (7) a great deal.

Table 1
Items used in this study to measure the inﬂuences on the decision to drive through
ﬂoodwater.
Item
no.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

2.3.1.7. Perception of risk. A single item was used to assess the level of perceived risk when the driver drove through the ﬂoodwater. Respondents
were asked “How risky do you think it was to drive through ﬂoodwater
on this occasion?” A slider scale was used to indicate the level of perceived
risk, with endpoints labelled ‘not at all risky’ to ‘extremely risky’. The slider
registered values from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely).
2.3.1.8. Demographic information. Demographic and background information collected in this study included:
5

Items used
The journey was urgent
No alternative route
Impractical alternative route (time/distance)
Lack of signage/indicators to show depth or danger
Behaviour of others, e.g. others driving through without problems
Careful consideration of the situation
Knowing the road well
Driving through ﬂoodwater previously without problem
Professional SES training/knowledge
Reassurance or encouragement from others in the vehicle
Belief in my own physical ability to drive through
Close proximity to destination/operational situation
Gut-feeling that it would be all right
Being directed to drive through the water by other emergency services/council
SES's attitude towards safety
Excitement - it being fun to do
Organisational pressure to complete my duty
My personal desire to complete my duty
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to 34, and those aged 35–55 were signiﬁcantly more likely to have driven
through (OR 2.07 and 1.44, respectively), χ2 (2, N = 666) = 9.747,
p > .0076. A two-way chi square revealed a signiﬁcant relationship between
gender and driving through ﬂoodwater, with males more likely to have
driven through ﬂoodwaters in the last two years (OR 2.03).
Most participants had held a full driving licence for 10 years or more
(82%). This group was more likely to have driven through ﬂoodwater in
the last two years, compared to those who had held their driving licence
for less than ten years (OR 1.79). The amount of time an individual spent
driving each week was found to relate to whether they had driven through
ﬂoodwaters in the last two years. Generally, more time spent driving on average each week related to an increasingly greater likelihood of having
driven through ﬂoodwater, e.g. those who drove >15 h per week on average were 5.6 times more likely to drive through ﬂoodwaters than individuals who drove <2 h per week, χ2 (3, N = 146) = 14.75, p > .002.
Increasing length of service, for volunteer personnel, was associated a
lower likelihood of having driven through ﬂoodwater in the last two
years. Generally, those with over ten years of service were least likely to
drive through ﬂoodwaters, with individuals with 5–10 years' service
(1.37 times more likely) and those with <5 years' experience (1.75
times) more likely to have driven through ﬂoodwaters in the last two years.
Two-way chi square analysis revealed signiﬁcant differences in the increased likelihood of having driven through ﬂoodwater in the last two
years for those who had current ﬂood rescue qualiﬁcations compared to
those without ﬂood rescue qualiﬁcations (OR 1.94), and those who get deployed to work in ﬂoodwaters (OR 1.81) compared to those who don't get
deployed.
Post hoc analysis of frequency of driving SES vehicles found that individuals who rarely drove an SES vehicle were the least likely to have driven
through ﬂoodwaters in the last two years χ2 (3, N = 338) = 21.752,
p > .000, compared to individuals that drove an SES vehicle all the time
(OR 1.28), those who drove an SES vehicle often (OR 2.56) and, those
who drove an SES vehicle occasionally (OR 2.12).
This phase of analysis revealed that even though personnel are encouraged by the organisation not to drive through ﬂoodwater at work, the proportion of participants who had driven through in the last two years was
high (54%). Interestingly, in this occupational sample male personnel
were found to be signiﬁcantly more likely to drive through ﬂoodwater
than females. This supports ﬁndings in the literature that males are more
likely
to
engage
in
driving
through
ﬂoodwater
([3,4,7,16,22,29,38,39,41]; Drobot et al., 2007).
Findings regarding age in this study indicate there might be differences
in driving through ﬂoodwater between public and SES personnel. A recent
study of self-reported ﬂood-related behaviour of river users in Australia
[42] reported that those aged 75+ years (42.9%) and 65–74 years old
(40.7%) were the highest proportion of respondents who had driven
through ﬂoodwaters; whereas in the present study younger male SES personnel aged 18–34 and 35–55 years were signiﬁcantly more likely to
have driven through ﬂoodwater.
The results regarding length of driving experience and ﬂood deployment indicated that those who had been driving longer and those who
get deployed to work in ﬂoods and storms were more likely to have driven
through ﬂoodwater. These former ﬁndings suggest that experience, and
possibly conﬁdence, play a part in driving through ﬂoodwater. Obviously,
those who are deployed to work in ﬂood conditions are likely to have
been exposed more to ﬂoodwater on the road in the last two years.
Therefore, a combination of conﬁdence and familiarity with driving in
ﬂood conditions, as well as increased exposure/potential to drive
through ﬂoodwater may be having an inﬂuence. Analysis found that
SES personnel who have current ﬂood rescue qualiﬁcations are also
more likely to have experience of driving through ﬂoodwater in the
last two years. Again, there is potential that such individuals will have
been sent to perform ﬂood rescues in ﬂood conditions and therefore
been exposed to ﬂoodwater on the road when travelling. However, it
is also more likely that they will have received training more recently
and have been educated about the risks involved with ﬂoodwater.

parametric (correlations and linear regressions) statistical tests were used
in conducting different stages of analyses in this study. Data analysis was
undertaken in a number of phases; ﬁrst with the full sample (n = 670) including both those who had driven into ﬂoodwater and those who had
not, then with the subsample who had driven through ﬂoodwater and provided detailed information about a speciﬁc incident when they drove
through ﬂoodwater in a work context (n = 201). This progressive approach
to analysis was used to explore the following research questions:
Phase 1: Chi square and post hoc tests
For the whole sample:
▪ Are there any differences in terms of demographic variables between
those who have, and have not, driven through ﬂoodwater in the last
two years?
Phase 2: Descriptive statistics, frequency and percentage distribution
For those who had driven through ﬂoodwater in the last two years:
▪ What are the contexts and conditions in which SES personnel have
driven through ﬂoodwater?
▪ What are the key factors that inﬂuenced risk perception when SES personnel drove through ﬂoodwater?
Phase 3: K-means cluster analyses, chi square test and multiple
regression
In relation to a speciﬁc incident of driving through ﬂoodwater
▪ What was the level of risk perceived at the time of the incident?
▪ What are the relationships between the expected risk factors and risk
perception of the incident?
▪ Which risk factors contributed more to risk perception when they drove
through ﬂoodwater?
Phase 4: Exploratory factor analysis - Principal component analysis
▪ What are the key factors inﬂuencing decision-making that are associated with driving through ﬂoodwater?

Phase 5: Correlation and Hierarchical multiple regression
▪ Is there any association between risk perception and the key
decision-making factors that are associated with driving through
ﬂoodwater?
▪ Which decision-making factors predict risk perception in situations that led to driving through ﬂoodwater?

3. Results and discussion
3.1. Phase 1. Exploring demographic differences between those who have, and
have not, driven through ﬂoodwater
Overall, in the sample of 670 SES personnel, 54.8% (n = 367) had
driven through ﬂoodwater as a driver in the last two years, compared to
45.2% (n = 303) who reported not having driven through.
Using a chi square analysis, signiﬁcant relationships were revealed between the decision to drive through ﬂoodwaters in the last two years and
participant demographics. These included: age; gender; years of holding a
full licence; length of service with the SES; driving hours per week; ﬂood
rescue qualiﬁcations; frequency of driving an SES work vehicle; and deployment to work in ﬂoodwater conditions (see Table 2). Post hoc analysis of
the multilevel variables within the chi square was undertaken. Fisher's
exact approach and odds ratio analysis were then used to determine what
level of participant demographics were contributing to the observed
variance.
Analysis by age, found that those over 55 years of age were least likely
to have driven through ﬂoodwater. Compared to this group, those aged 18
6
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Table 2
Frequencies, percentages, and adjusted standardised residuals (ASR) for driving through ﬂoodwaters in the last two years.
Variables

Had driven through ﬂoodwater once or more in the last two years
No

Yes

f

%

fe

ASR

Gender
Male
Female

179
124

26.7
18.5

205.8
97.2

Age
18 to 34
35 to 54
55 and above

52
111
138

34.8
43.5
52.6

Years holding full driving licence
<10 years
39
More than 10 years
254
Driving hours per week
Less than 2 h
2–7 h
8–14 h
15 h or more

a

Total

χ2 (p value)

a

f

%

fe

ASR

−4.5
4.5

276
91

41.2
13.6

249.2
117.8

4.5
−4.5

455
215

19.812, p = .001

67.3
115.2
118.4

−2.8
−0.6
3.1

97
144
124

65.1
56.4
47.3

81.6
139.7
143.5

2.8
0.6
−3.1

149
255
262

12.575, p = .002

5.8
37.9

52.5
240.5

−2.8
2.8

79
286

11.8
42.7

65.5
299.5

2.8
−2.8

118
540

7.669, p = .006

5.5
19.7
12.1
6.7

23.3
122.7
83.7
65.4

4.0
1.5
−0.5
−3.8

15
142
106
101

2.2
21.2
15.8
15.1

28.7
151.3
103.3
80.6

−4.0
−1.5
0.5
3.8

52
274
187
146

27.572, p = .001

Length of service (paid personnel)
<5 years
31
5–10 years
11
More than 10 years
11

4.6
1.6
1.6

29.0
12.4
11.5

0.7
−0.6
−0.2

32
16
14

4.8
2.4
2.1

34.0
14.6
13.5

−0.7
0.6
0.2

63
27
25

0.601, p = .740

Length of service (volunteer personnel)
<5 years
130
5–10 years
52
More than 10 years
78

19.4
7.8
11.6

112.8
52.3
94.9

2.9
−0.1
−2.9

129
68
140

19.3
10.1
20.9

146.2
67.7
123.1

−2.9
0.1
2.9

259
120
218

10.005, p = .007

Current ﬂood rescue qualiﬁcations
Yes
196
No, or not current
92

29.3
13.7

216.1
71.9

−3.7
3.7

294
71

43.9
10.6

273.9
91.1

3.7
−3.7

490
163

13.412, p = .001

Deployed to work in ﬂood conditions
Yes
212
No
85

31.6
12.7

229.2
67.8

−3.2
3.2

298
66

44.5
9.9

280.8
83.2

3.2
−3.2

510
151

10.206, p = .001

Frequency of driving SES work vehicles
Rarely
119
Occasionally
78
Often
54
All the time
8

17.8
11.6
8.1
1.2

92.0
89.8
70.3
6.9

4.7
−2.0
−3.0
0.5

93
129
108
8

13.9
19.3
16.1
1.2

120.0
117.2
91.7
9.1

−4.7
2.0
3.0
−0.5

212
207
162
16

23.715, p = .001

a

37
132
81
45

The adjusted standardised residual is the observed frequency—expected frequency/estimated standard error.

ﬂoodwater conditions would have been challenging. It was raining in
51.7% of incidents (n = 104), which varied from light rain to heavy rain.
In terms of the ﬂoodwater characteristics of water depth and water
ﬂow, both key factors known to affect vehicle stability, around three quarters of incidents occurred in water that was estimated to be >15 cm deep
(77.1%, n = 155). This is above the level at which some vehicles are at a
risk of becoming unstable [17] and above a level that is generally communicated to the public to be particularly unsafe to enter through the “15 to
ﬂoat” campaign Victoria SES 2017 [43]. The results regarding velocity of
water indicated that although SES personnel took risks entering deeper
water, they mostly drove through water with low velocity (slow or still
water) (92.0%, n = 185). A minority of incidents (16.9%, n = 34) took
place in water deeper than 45 cm, and 7.9% (n = 16) took place in water
with moderate or rapid ﬂow. Clearly, these less frequent but seemingly
more risky incidents need to be investigated more closely.
In terms of vehicle characteristics, dual cabs/light truck vehicles were
most frequently being driven (44.2%, n = 89) and in the majority of incidents vehicles were four-wheel drive (67.7%, n = 136) indicating that vehicles typically larger and heavier than passenger vehicles were mostly
being driven when ﬂoodwater was entered.
Activities being undertaken at the time of entering ﬂoodwater were,
most commonly, emergency response ‘under lights and sirens’ (i.e. urgent
response) (n = 101, 51%) and emergency response ‘not under lights and sirens’ 31% (n = 61). Other responses included undertaking a private journey (21%; n = 42), travelling to/from an SES unit (17%; n = 35), and

Training might also increase conﬁdence, leading to personnel
minimising the risks of driving through ﬂoodwater on roads.
3.2. Phase 2: Exploring the conditions in which SES personnel drove through
ﬂoodwater
To explore the conditions and contexts of the ﬂoodwater when they
drove through it, participants were asked to recall their most recent or
memorable experience of entering ﬂoodwater with vehicles in work conditions, ideally in the last few years. A total of 201 participants completed this
detailed section. Table 4 summarises the various characteristics and conditions in which participants reported driving through ﬂoodwater.
Regarding spatial and environmental characteristics, around half of
these incidents (49.3%, n = 99) took place in rural and remote areas, and
a similar proportion of incidents (54.2%, n = 109) occurred on minor or
residential road. Interestingly, a majority drove through the ﬂoodwater
on a normal stretch of road (78.1%, n = 157). A noted earlier, recent fatality data indicated that a large majority of fatalities (87%) took place when
vehicles were driven across creeks, bridges or causeways [9], suggesting
that most of the incidents described by participants are likely to have not
been life threatening in terms of this speciﬁc aspect.
Although around two thirds of incidents occurred in daylight (64.2%,
n = 129), just under a quarter took place at night (23.4%, n = 47) and
22 of these incidents (10.9%) occurred in locations without street lighting.
In these latter situations, it is likely that accurate assessment of the
7
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category of these three variables contributed more to predict risk perception (Table 5).
Multiple regression analysis using dummy coding for categorical variables (location, water depth and water velocity) revealed that perception
of risk was signiﬁcantly associated with these three variables. The results
indicated that those driving in rural/remote areas, or where water depth
was >15 cm, and in situations with high water velocity were more likely
to perceive the risk of their driving through ﬂoodwater incident as high.
Conversely, they were more likely to perceive the risk of driving through
ﬂoodwater as ‘low risk’ when the location was urban/suburban, or water
depth was <15 cm, or water velocity was low (slow/still).
Examining how emergency services personnel perceived the risks of
driving through ﬂoodwater and investigating the relationships between
the key risk factors and their link to risk perception is helpful for a better understanding of the risk assessment process when entering ﬂoodwater. From
the overall result of this phase of the analysis, it can be concluded that these
three characteristics – water depth, water ﬂow, and location, played an important role in the risk assessment of SES personnel. Although how these
three features work together is not identiﬁed in this study, it is nonetheless
evident that these key features contribute signiﬁcantly to risk perception,
and could usefully be exploited in engagement and communication around
the risks of driving in ﬂoodwater.

routine work (11%, n = 23). This clearly supports expectations that occupational exposure and the nature of emergency service work is a risk factor
for this group. In a third of incidents (32.8%, n = 66) visible signage indicating ﬂooded road conditions, such as road closure, depth indicators and
ﬂood warnings signage was present, but was ignored. In just under two
thirds of reported incidents (64.2%, n = 129) there was no visible signage
on the road when they drove through. In 2015, Austroads, the peak body
for road management in Australia, stated that the vast majority of the approximate 20,000 ﬂoodways in Australia and New Zealand were not constructed in accordance with required design and hydraulic standards, and
lacked appropriate signage. They also reported that depth gauges could
be misinterpreted, posing a risk to road users in ﬂood situations [44].

3.3. Phase 3: Relationship between key risk assessment factors and risk
perception
The conceptual decision-making model of the present study (Fig. 1) indicated that risk assessment factors (spatial, environmental, ﬂoodwater, vehicle characteristics) existing at the time of the incident contribute to
construct the individual's risk perception. This part of the analysis sought
to identify the relationship between risk assessment factors and level of
risk perception, and verify the degree of contribution of those risk factors
to risk perception.
To investigate the level of perceived risk associated with the reported
incidents of driving through ﬂoodwater a K-means cluster analysis, using
the z-scores, was performed on the variable ‘perceived risk’. This approach
was used to divide the sample into two risk typologies; those who perceived
the incident to be higher (High) risk, and those who perceived the incident
to be lower (Low) risk. This K-means cluster analysis is summarised in
Table 3.
The ﬁrst cluster, labelled ‘low risk’ comprised 83.6% (n = 168) participants, and the second cluster labelled ‘high risk’ comprised 16.4% (n =
33). Next chi square analyses were conducted to investigate differences between these two clusters in terms of incident-speciﬁc contextual variables.
The results from chi square analysis presented in Table 4 revealed that
within the lower perceived risk group the majority of reported incidents occurred in urban/suburban and regional areas (55.9.%; n = 94), whereas
within the higher perceived risk group the majority of reported incidents
occurred in rural/remote areas (75.7%; n = 26) (χ2 = 11.209,
p < .005). In terms of water depth, 93.9% of reported incidents (n = 31)
in the high perceived risk group occurred when the water height was
>15 cm compared to 73.8% (n = 124) for the low perceived risk group
(χ2 = 6.33, p < .01).
The most highly statistically signiﬁcant result was found for water velocity (χ2 = 20.099, p < .001). Only 4.1% (n = 7) of reported incidents
perceived to be low risk occurred with high water velocity, compared to
27.2% (n = 9) of those reported to be high risk. Differences were not
found to be statistically signiﬁcant for other variables like road type, crossing type, lighting conditions, weather conditions and vehicle operation
type.
Overall, results suggest that risk perception was most differentiated by
the three key features: location, water depth and water ﬂow. Based on
these results multiple regression analysis was conducted to see which

3.4. Phase 4: Factors inﬂuencing decision-making
In our conceptual model (Fig. 1), socio-cognitive inﬂuences form a large
part of the risk processing component of the model. These affect the ‘situational analysis’ along with the key factors of risk assessment to inform risk
perception.
To identify the key inﬂuences on decision-making during the incident of
driving through ﬂoodwater in this study, exploratory factor analysis was
conducted on the set of 18 inﬂuencing items used in the questionnaire,
using principal components analysis (PCA) as the method of factor extraction. To decide what factors to retain, the study used the scree plot. Initially
an oblique rotation was used to assess factor correlation and later varimax
was used as a ﬁnal rotation. Individual loadings of 0.40 or greater were
used in the factor designation. Extracted factors were examined and
named based on an analysis of the items loading on each factor. Cronbach
alpha (α) was used to estimate the internal consistency of the items constituting a factor. The Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin test and Bartlett test of Sphericity
were undertaken. This analysis indicated that the Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin coefﬁcient for this dataset was 0.735 and the Bartlett test of Sphericity was statistically signiﬁcant (χ2 = 742.809, df = 153, P < .0001) indicating that
properties of the correlation matrix justiﬁed factor analysis being carried
out. Table 6 shows the factor loading score for each item.
Varimax factor rotation identiﬁed six latent factors. Extraction of factors
was based both upon Kaiser's criterion for Eigenvalues of equal to or greater
than unity and use of a Scree plot. The six factors identiﬁed accounted for
60.0% of the total variance within the data (see Table 7). One of the
items (“close proximity to destination”) was removed, as its highest factor
loading was below 0.30. In addition, the item had low communality scores,
indicating that the extracted factors explain little of these items' variance. A
sixth factor contained a single item (“lack of signage/indicators to show
depth or danger”); this factor was retained, as the item had a high factor
loading and it was uncorrelated with other variables.
Signiﬁcant factor loadings were used to identify and interpret themes,
then each factor was labelled with a factor name that the research team
felt best represented the overarching theme. The ﬁrst factor, labelled
“Organisational training and safety” describes the professional experiences,
training and knowledge participants felt they had to negotiate the risks of
driving in ﬂood conditions. This factor encompasses three items covering issues such as professional SES training/knowledge; SES's attitude towards
safety and careful consideration of the situation. This factor accounted for
20.86% of the total variance and had a total eigenvalue of 3.75.
The second factor labelled “External locus of control” refers to how
much people attribute the decision to drive through ﬂoodwater to external

Table 3
Cluster centroids for the perceived level of risk score.
Perceived
level of risk
score

Z score
Number of
cases

Cluster 1

Cluster
2

Low risk

High
risk

F

df

p

Distances
between
ﬁnal cluster
centres

−0.36770
1.8719 446.601⁎⁎ 199 <.001 2.240
168
33

** p < 0.01.
8
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Table 4
Frequencies, percentages, and adjusted standardised residuals (ASR) for the contexts and conditions in which SES personnel drove through ﬂoodwater and the level of perceived risk associated with these incidents.
Contextual variables

Low perceived risk

High perceived risk

Total

χ2

ƒ

%

ƒe

ASR

ƒ

%

ƒe

ASR

Location type
Urban/suburban
Regional
Rural/remote

63
31
74

37.5
18.4
44.0

57.7
27.6
82.7

2.1
1.8
−3.3

6
2
25

18.2
6.06
75.7

11.3
5.4
16.3

−2.1
−1.8
3.3

69
33
99

11.209, p = .004**

Road type
Highway/major
Minor/residential
Unsealed/track

45
96
27

26.7
57.1
16.0

47.6
91.1
29.3

−1.1
1.9
−1.1

12
13
8

36.3
39.
24.2

9.4
17.9
5.7

1.1
−1.9
1.1

57
109
35

3.552, p = .169

Crossing type
Normal stretch of road
A ford or weir
Bridge or causeway

133
8
27

79.1
4.7
16.0

131.2
7.5
29.3

0.8
0.4
−1.1

24
1
8

72.7
3.03
24.2

25.8
1.5
5.7

−0.8
−0.4
1.1

157
9
35

1.389, p = .499

Depth of water
Less than 15 cm
>15 cm

44
124

26.1
73.8

38.4
129.6

2.5
−2.5

2
31

6.06
93.9

7.6
25.4

−2.5
2.5

46
155

6.33, p = .012

Water velocity
Low
High

161
7

95.8
4.1

154.6
13.4

4.5
−4.5

24
9

72.7
27.2

30.4
2.6

−4.5
4.5

185
16

20.099, p < .001***

Lighting conditions
Day light
Dusk/dawn
Night - dark

113
21
34

67.2
12.5
0.59

107.8
20.9
39.3

2.1
0.1
−2.4

16
4
13

48.4
12.1
39.3

21.2
4.1
7.7

−2.1
−0.1
2.4

129
25
47

5.847, p = .054

Weather conditions
Rain
No rain

84
84

50.0
50.0

86.9
81.1

−1.1
1.1

20
13

60.6
39.9

15.9
17.1

1.1
−1.1

104
97

1.243, p = .265

Vehicles operation type
4WD
AWD/2WD

116
53

69.0
31.5

113.7
54.3

0.9
−0.9

20
12

60.6
36.3

22.3
10.7

−0.9
0.9

136
65

0.898, p = .343

a
The adjusted standardised residual is the observed frequency—expected frequency/estimated standard error.
⁎ p <0.05. ⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎⁎⁎ p < .001.

The third factor, labelled “Self-efﬁcacy judgement”, grouped together
items that appeared to describe a combination of self-efﬁcacy and optimism. Self-efﬁcacy is the belief in one's own ability to do something [45].
Self-efﬁcacy refers here to the belief of the driver that the behaviour – “driving through ﬂoodwater” can be executed successfully. This encompasses
four items covering issues such as gut feeling that it would be all right,
knowing the road well, driving through ﬂoodwater previously without
problem, and belief in my own physical ability to drive through. This factor
accounted for 8.46% of the total variance and had a total eigenvalue of
1.52.
The fourth factor labelled as “Journey characteristics” comprises three
items and covers issues such as no alternative route, urgency to continue
journey and impractical alternatives to change journey plan based on
time and distance. This factor accounted for 7.74% of the variance and
had a total eigenvalue of 1.39.
The ﬁfth factor labelled “Social inﬂuences” includes items that describe
the perceived social pressures or encouragements from others to perform
the behaviour. This factor comprises three items covering the behaviour
of others, e.g. others driving through without problems, reassurance or encouragement from others in the vehicle, and the behaviour being exciting
‘fun to do’. This factor accounted for 6.28% of the total variance and had
a total eigenvalue of 1.13.
The ﬁnal, sixth, factor labelled “Absence of risk signals” related to the
absence of warnings, signage and indicators that signal danger. This factor
included only one item and accounted for 5.64% of the variance and had an
Eigenvalue of 1.01.
Previous research ﬁndings supported the relevance of these themes as
key inﬂuences in driving and health behaviour-related contexts. Rogers
[46] states that “There is a fundamental link between training, experience

factors. People with a high internal locus of control (‘internals’) tend to believe that most things that happen are their own fault, regardless of objective cause. On the other hand, those with a high external locus of control
(‘externals’) tend not to accept blame for anything, preferring instead to believe in environmental reasons, even if they have clearly instigated an incident. In the present research, three items that generally covered external
inﬂuences loaded onto this factor. The items are organisational pressure
to complete my duty, my personal desire to complete my duty, and being
directed to drive through the water by other emergency services/council.
Although the second item contained an element of internal motivation
(‘my personal desire’) it was felt that it was the external act of ‘duty’ or service to others that was being triggered in the context of these other
externally-driven items for this factor. This factor accounted for 11.03%
of the total variance and had a total eigenvalue of 1.98.

Table 5
Summary of multiple regression analysis for location, water depth and water velocity on perceived level of risk.
Factors
Location
Rural/remote
Urban/suburban
Depth of water
Less than 15 cm
Water velocity
High

β

SE B

0.231⁎
−0.010

3.3
3.5

0.189⁎⁎

2.8

0.342⁎⁎⁎

4.1

R

R2

df

F

0.238

0.057

198

5.94⁎⁎

0.189

0.036

199

7.37⁎⁎

0.342

0.117

199

26.32⁎⁎⁎

* p < 0.05.
** p <0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
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Table 6
Factor loadings for exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation of inﬂuences on decision-making.
Items

Factors

The journey was urgent
No alternative route
Impractical alternative route (time/distance)
Lack of signage/indicators to show depth or danger
Behaviour of others, e.g. others driving through without problems
Careful consideration of the situation
Knowing the road well
Driving through ﬂoodwater previously without problem
Professional SES training/knowledge
Reassurance or encouragement from others in the vehicle
Belief in my own physical ability to drive through
Close proximity to destination/operational situation
Gut-feeling that it would be all right
Being directed to drive through the water by other emergency services/council
SES's attitude towards safety
Excitement - it being fun to do
Organisational pressure to complete my duty
My personal desire to complete my duty

1

2

3

4

5

6

0.312
0.215
−0.154
−0.066
0.021
0.625
0.141
0.094
0.820
0.362
0.430
0.283
−0.152
−0.055
0.682
−0.008
0.084
0.208

0.203
0.105
−0.028
0.022
−0.123
−0.090
−0.287
0.183
0.062
0.318
0.078
0.225
0.247
0.595
0.135
0.360
0.805
0.742

−0.004
0.166
0.134
−0.059
0.046
0.154
0.662
0.666
0.116
−0.009
0.672
0.303
0.709
−0.072
0.062
0.092
0.048
0.206

0.661
0.661
0.745
0.086
0.101
0.223
0.101
0.240
0.083
−0.002
0.070
0.317
−0.031
0.221
0.016
−0.215
0.028
0.126

−0.310
−0.065
0.208
0.124
0.804
0.046
−0.128
0.063
−0.086
0.433
−0.037
0.105
0.274
0.288
0.104
0.487
−0.021
−0.054

0.079
0.074
−0.026
0.885
0.175
−0.359
−0.047
−0.112
0.051
−0.058
0.017
0.323
0.097
−0.230
0.038
0.008
0.072
0.162

Extraction method: principal component analysis.
Rotation method: varimax with Kaiser normalization.
Note. Factor loadings >0.40 are in boldface.

and technological competence that provides the knowledge required to
make intuitive decisions.” Locus of control research [47] shows that it
clearly relates to driving in areas such as skill and accident involvement.
Individuals with an internal locus of control are more attentive, motivated, and adept at avoiding aversive situations; hence, internality is negatively related to accident involvement [47]. Perceived self-efﬁcacy [48] in
contexts such as health behaviour change [49–51] has been associated
with adaptive behaviours and more positive outcomes. In recent years,
route-choice modelling has been the topic of several theoretical studies
[52] which indicate that journey characteristics, speciﬁcally travellers'
route choice, are important in decision-making aspects of driving. For example, Lindsey et al. [53] studied the effects of pre-trip information on
route-choice decisions when travel conditions are congested and stochastic,
and Yang and Jiang [54] developed an enhanced route choice model which
can realistically identify risk attitudes and time reliability demands.
Regarding social inﬂuences, in disaster situations where options are
often ambiguous and decisions need to be made quickly, it is argued that
people often look to see what other people are doing to manage the situation and then act accordingly [55]. Research ﬁndings are also evident for
the signiﬁcance of risk signals. Prior research in the United States has
found that drivers make judgements on whether to drive through ﬂoodwaters based on visual cues in the environment such as depth indicator signs
[56,57]. The themes that emerged from factor analyses in the present
study are grouped differently to previous psychological research applied
to driving though ﬂoodwaters [31] where the key inﬂuences on driver decision making were themed as successful past experiences, individual deliberative motivational and impulsive inﬂuences, social and environmental
context, and judgements of self-efﬁcacy.

3.5. Phase 5: Predicting perceived level of risks from the factors that inﬂuence
decision-making
Previously research [31] has identiﬁed the key inﬂuences on driver
decision-making. However, how those inﬂuences relate with each other
and work in a model of decision-making has not been explored. In this
ﬁnal phase of analysis, we sought to use quantitative statistical methods
to investigate the link between socio-cognitive inﬂuences of risk perception
in the set of incidents in which SES personnel drove through ﬂoodwater.
A six-step hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed on
the dependent variable of perceived level of risk. The ‘Organisational training and safety’ factor was entered in step 1. The ‘External locus of control
factor’ was entered at step 2, the ‘Self-efﬁcacy judgement’ factor at step 3,
‘Journey characteristics’ at step 4, ‘Social inﬂuences’ at step 5, and ‘Absence
of risk signals’ at step 6. Intercorrelations between the multiple regression
factors are reported in Table 8 and the regression statistics are in Table 9.
The hierarchical multiple regression revealed that at stage one,
organisational training and safety contributed signiﬁcantly to the regression model, F (1,199) = 17.58, p < .01 and accounted for 8.1% of the variation in perceived level of risk. Introducing the external locus of control
factor explained an additional 2.7% of variation in perceived risk level
and this change in R2 was signiﬁcant, Fchange (1,198) = 6.002, p < .05.
Adding self-efﬁcacy judgement, Fchange (1,197) = 0.285, p > .05 at
stage 3; Journey characteristics, Fchange (1,196) = 2.39, p > .05 at stage
4 and Social inﬂuences, Fchange (1,195) = 3.08, p > .05 at stage 5 to the
regression model explained additional 0.1%; 1.1% and 1.4% of the variation in perceived risk level, respectively and this change in R2 was not signiﬁcant (p > .05). Finally, the addition of Absence of risk signals to the
regression model explained an additional 2.3% of the variation in perceived
risk level and this change in R2 square was also signiﬁcant, F (1,194) =
5.18, p < .05. When all six independent variables were included in the
ﬁnal stage of the regression model, External locus of control was not a signiﬁcant predictor of perceived risk. The most important predictor of perceived risk was Organisational training and safety, which uniquely
explained 28.5% of the variance. Together the six independent variables
accounted for 39.6% of the variance in perceived risk.
The results of the analysis indicated that the organisational training,
knowledge and safety factor was signiﬁcantly negatively associated with
perceived risk, and had the most signiﬁcant contribution to risk perception.
It revealed that those who felt their professional skills, training and safety
attitudes had a greater inﬂuence on their decision to drive through ﬂoodwater were more likely to perceive the risk of driving through the

Table 7
Total variance explained by principal component analysis for inﬂuencing factors of
decision-making.
Component

1 Organisational training and safety
2 External locus of control
3 Self-efﬁcacy judgements
4 Journey characteristics
5 Social inﬂuences
6 Absence of risk signals

Extraction sums of squared loadings
Total

% of variance

Cumulative %

3.755
1.986
1.524
1.394
1.131
1.015

20.861
11.031
8.465
7.747
6.283
5.640

20.861
31.892
40.357
48.103
54.386
60.026
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Table 8
Means, standard deviations and bivariate correlations between all variables (inﬂuencing factors of decision-making and perceived level of risk) in the model.
Sl.

Variables

1

1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Organisational training and safety
External locus of control
Self-efﬁcacy judgements
Journey characteristics
Social inﬂuences
Absence of risk signals
Perceived level of risk

–
0.224⁎⁎
0.317⁎⁎
0.274⁎⁎
0.133
−0.100
−0.285⁎⁎

2

3

0.203⁎⁎
0.244⁎⁎
0.264⁎⁎

4

0.287⁎⁎
0.160⁎
−0.032
−0.102

0.076
0.096

5

0.039
0.085
0.042

0.138
0.103

6

Mean

SD

0.219⁎⁎

14.01
6.72
16.11
12.61
6.85
2.49
28.01

4.72
4.13
5.98
5.17
3.52
1.89
16.46

* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.

ﬂoodwater on that occasion as low. Seemingly, belief in being highly
trained and skilled at considering risks in the situation at hand was associated with feeling it was not risky to drive through the ﬂoodwater. On the
other hand, the external locus of control factor was signiﬁcantly positively
associated with perceived level of risk. This suggests that an increased sense
of duty and organisational pressure to perform one's duty was associated
with driving through ﬂoodwater that was considered higher risk.
Absence of risk signals was the other remaining factor that was linked to
perceived risk. The analysis indicated that absence of risk signals (road
signage, depth markers, warnings and messages) was signiﬁcantly positively associated with perception of risk, such that those who felt that an absence of risk signals contributed more to their decision to drive through
ﬂoodwater also felt it was riskier when they drove through the ﬂoodwater.

4.1. Practical implications of the study
4.1.1. Educational awareness, skills training and knowledge
Emergency workers need to be provided with the knowledge and skills
to enable them to assess the risk associated with the different ﬂoodwater situations they may encounter during their operational activities. This includes understanding of the consequences of those risks and possible
preventive measures that may be taken to mitigate risks. As the general policy is not to enter ﬂoodwater, there is no current training program in the
SES organisation under study that was related to driving in ﬂoodwater.
The ﬁndings of the study revealed that certain groups such as younger personnel (aged 35–55 years), volunteer personnel with <10 years' of service,
those who are often deployed in ﬂoods and those who frequently drive SES
vehicles were more likely to drive through ﬂoodwater Additional training
or interventions might be designed that are tailored to different groups of
personnel, e.g. ‘refresher’ training for those with longer service, or ‘focussed
risk analysis training’ for those with greater frequency of ﬂood deployment
or who work in more dangerous operational conditions for longer periods
of time. This study's ﬁndings suggest that more training is required for identiﬁcation of water-related hazards on roads during ﬂood, as well as the development of more effective risk assessment strategies and more effective
internal ﬂood risk messaging. Given the prevalence of driving through

4. Applications/implications of the study
There is no similar research exploring the situations in which emergency services personnel engage in risky driving behaviour in ﬂoodwater,
or other contexts. The ﬁndings of the study have a number of practical implications for the development of occupational safety management strategies to ensure the safety of the emergency services personnel in
operational contexts and to prevent and reduce the number and severity
of injuries and associated costs of driving through ﬂoodwater on roads.

Table 9
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for variables predicting perceived level of risks.
Factors
Step 1
Organisational training and safety
Step 2
Organisational training and safety
External locus of control
Step 3
Organisational training and safety
External locus of control
Self-efﬁcacy judgements
Step 4
Organisational training and safety
External locus of control
Self-efﬁcacy judgements
Journey characteristics
Step 5
Organisational training and safety
External locus of control
Self-efﬁcacy judgements
Journey characteristics
Social inﬂuences
Step 6
Organisational training and safety
External locus of control
Self-efﬁcacy judgements
Journey characteristics
Social inﬂuences
Absence of risk signals

B

SE B

β

R

−0.993

0.23

−0.285⁎⁎

−1.125
0.672

0.24
0.27

−0.323⁎⁎
0.169⁎

−1.087
0.693
−0.105

0.25
0.27
0.19

−0.312⁎⁎
0.174⁎
−0.038

−1.155
0.620
−0.166
0.356

0.25
0.28
0.20
0.23

−1.181
0.500
−0.203
0.383
0.572

0.25
0.28
0.20
0.23
0.32

−0.339⁎⁎
0.126
−0.074
0.120
0.122

−1.102
0.469
−0.180
0.323
0.465
1.337

0.25
0.28
0.19
0.22
0.32
0.58

−0.316⁎⁎
0.118
−0.066
0.102
0.100
0.154⁎

−0.331⁎⁎
0.156⁎

R2

ΔR2

F

ΔF
17.58⁎⁎

0.285

0.081

0.081

17.58⁎⁎

0.329

0.108

0.027

12.01⁎⁎

6.002⁎

0.331

0.110

0.001

8.07⁎⁎

0.285

0.347

0.120

0.011

6.69⁎⁎

2.390

0.366

0.134

0.014

6.03⁎⁎

3.082

0.396

0.156

0.023

5.99⁎⁎

5.181⁎

−0.060
0.112

Note. n = 201.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01
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ﬂoodwater in work vehicles, increased engagement of personnel around
the dangers of driving in ﬂoodwater could be beneﬁcial, with the use of
photographs, video clips, and scenarios as training tools. Facilitated group
discussions may help in inﬂuencing risk assessment and decision-making,
particularly in complex environments with competing priorities, e.g. personal vs. public safety.

occupational health and safety. However, like any study of this nature,
there are a number of limitations that need to be acknowledged. The ﬁrst,
is that the participants of this study were from an East Coast jurisdiction
of SES which might not be representative of all jurisdictions in Australia. Although the sample size is adequate for analysis, statistical ﬁndings should
be viewed as vigorous, but indicative of the sample, rather than representative of the whole organisation. Moreover, as the study only provides ﬁndings from a single Australian State's SES agency, similar research in other
states or territories may identify different results, particularly those in
northern states more prone to ﬂooding during wet season and with less
dense and more dispersed populations.
Second, this is a cross sectional study and provides only a snapshot of a
set of incidents, not all incidents, of driving through ﬂoodwater. As we requested details about a single recent memorable incident, participants
probably recalled more salient, and possibly more extreme, incidents. Although choosing a more salient incident may offset some effects of recall
bias, it is possible that a combination of recall bias, especially for less recent
incidents, and social desirability (expected social norm) may have inﬂuenced the choice of incident reported.
In relation to the degree of risk associated with an incident, we have no
way of knowing objectively how risky or safe it was. Assessment of water
ﬂow is likely to be subjective, as noted in the vehicle stability study of
Smith et al. [20]. Judgement of ﬂow velocity (and often depth) is difﬁcult
in real world situations. Additional variables, such as weather-related variables, e.g. poor visibility due to heavy rain or strong wind, may also inﬂuence the assessment of water depth and ﬂow. However, the subjective
judgement of these attributes is used to inform decision-making and determine behaviour in the situations reported here and therefore the self-report
of these characteristics is still a valid measure to explore in this study.
In an organisational situation where SES personnel are discouraged
from driving through ﬂoodwater, there would potential for embarrassment
in admitting to acting unsafely, therefore participants may have felt a need
to minimise or excuse their risk-taking in the way they answered some
questions, although we would expect that assurances of anonymity and
conﬁdentiality would have reduced some of these impacts. Finally, the
study included the EPPM theory concepts in the ﬁnal step of the decisionmaking model, which proposed that individual's fear, or danger control
processes turn mental simulation outcomes into action. However, the
study could not assess and interpret clearly how these two processes (fear
or danger) relate to risk perception. Further research is required to explore
the relevance of the EPPM theory constructs in this decision-making model
of driving through ﬂoodwater behaviour to further explore and verify the
model.

4.1.2. Reﬁning risk assessment strategies
Poor quality risk assessment and risk management, and poor decisionmaking about risk, have been identiﬁed as contributing factors in workplace fatality, injury, disease and ill-health and in many major disasters
[58]. Understanding and managing risk is central to achieving the outcomes and targets of the Australian Work Health and Safety Strategy
2012–2022 [59]. The ﬁndings of the current research could be used to tailor an effective risk assessments strategy for emergency services.
4.1.3. Improving organisational safety
The general guidance to avoid driving through ﬂoodwater and the relatively high prevalence of driving through ﬂoodwater reported in this study
suggest that organisational policy and practice are not aligned. The need to
balance the workplace health and safety of personnel with operational requirements and the risk associated with saving lives presents complex
organisational challenges. The results of this study can be used to inform
further discussions and act as a baseline for further safety interventions,
or serve as a catalyst for policy review and reform.
The results of this study also have implications for existing safety management practices, through exploring common beliefs and attitudes towards safety as part of possible intervention strategies. The ﬁndings
reveal that more needs to be done to explore the organisational safety climate (the shared perceptions of safety policies and practices among personnel of the organisation) regarding entering ﬂoodwater in vehicles.
4.1.4. Flood risk communication public messaging and campaigns
Providing critical safety and preparedness information to help communities prepare for, respond to and recover from emergencies and disasters is
one of the major functions of the SES. The ﬁndings of the study could help
SES design more effective ﬂood risk communication messaging for the public and enhance community emergency response capacity and capability.
Identifying factors that inﬂuence SES personnel when driving through
ﬂoodwater might be transferable to the decision-making of the public.
Therefore, these research ﬁndings may help to design more effective public
messaging campaigns to reduce driving through ﬂoodwater.
Although it was not an aim of this research to make direct comparisons
between the emergency services (SES) and the general public, some tentative demographic comparisons could be possible from the ﬁndings of this
study and studies of the general public. In terms of the ﬁndings being transferrable to the general public, the ﬁndings of this study possess useful insights for future research that, if the comparisons could be drawn in
meaningful way, could beneﬁt both groups to reduce the risks of driving
through ﬂoodwater.

6. Conclusion
This research contributes to our understanding about risk perception
and how it relates to driving through ﬂoodwater by emergency services personnel. The study found that, despite general guidance not to enter ﬂoodwater, more than half of those surveyed had driven through ﬂoodwater in
the last two years in work vehicles. Males, those doing more driving per
week, and volunteers with >10 years SES experience were among some
of the groups more likely to have driven through ﬂoodwater in the last
two years. Most incidents of driving through ﬂoodwater occurred in nonurgent responses (i.e. not under lights and sirens), with adequate light (during the day), in good weather condition (no rain), crossing water on a normal stretch of (ﬂooded) road, with low water ﬂow. These factors helped
respondents drive through ﬂoodwater successfully on most occasions without damage to vehicles or personal injuries. As driving in ﬂoodwater is discouraged, it is interesting to consider why many respondents took risks
driving through ﬂoodwater when they were unable to be certain of the
safety of the situation (e.g. water ﬂow, road integrity) to perform nonurgent work. Although there is only a small number of cases, some personnel drove through ﬂoodwater in conditions when the risk of harm was perceived to be greater, i.e. through water deeper than 15 cm, at night with no
streetlights, in steady or heavy rain, or ignoring road signage.

5. Strengths and limitations of the study
This study is the ﬁrst of its kind in Australia to investigate emergency
services personnel driving through ﬂoodwater. The current study has a
number of strengths. The use of a deﬁnition of ﬂoodwater on the road,
and a reference image for estimating the depth of water driven through
were important additions to the study that will have resulted in better quality data. The use of an independent research team investigating safety practices and ensuring the anonymity of respondent, should also have improved
the integrity of the data. The study was supported by senior management in
the SES and the sample size was adequate for statistical power in analysis.
The survey collected very detailed information about the contexts and conditions in which SES personnel drove through ﬂoodwater, and the data collected has the potential to be very useful for the organisation in
understanding the behaviour of its personnel and for improving
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Location, water depth, and ﬂow contributed notably to risk perception
and three factors that inﬂuenced the decision to drive through ﬂoodwater
were found to be most strongly associated with risk perception. These
were ‘Organisational training and safety’, ‘External locus of control’ and
‘Absence of risk signals’. Thus, SES personnel who felt their professional
skills and training and careful consideration of the situation contributed
to their decision also felt that risks were lower when they drove through
ﬂoodwater. Conversely, high external locus of control and an absence of
risk signals (warnings, signs and indicators) led personnel to perceive
higher risks when they drove through ﬂoodwater.
The results from this study indicate that more needs to be done to communicate the risks of entering ﬂoodwater in work vehicles. These ﬁndings
identify some key aspects that have salience in risk processing and risk perception that can be used to help design more effective risk assessment strategies, to design training tools and safety programs, and to contribute overall
to improvements in workplace health and safety management practices.
Credit authorship contribution statement
Mozumdar Arifa Ahmed:Conceptualization, Methodology, Data
curation, Formal analysis, Writing - original draft, Writing - review &
editing. Katharine Haynes:Conceptualization, Methodology, Resources.
Matalena Tofa:Project administration, Resources, Visualization, Investigation. Gemma Hope:Data curation, Resources, Visualization. Mel Taylor:
Conceptualization, Methodology, Supervision, Writing - review & editing.
Declaration of competing interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing ﬁnancial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to inﬂuence the
work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgement
The research was funded by Bushﬁre and Natural Hazards Co-operative
Research Centre, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia as a part of Flood risk communication project - Utilisation and Monitoring and Evaluation
References
[1] Ahmed MA, Haynes K, Taylor M. Driving into ﬂoodwater: a systematic review of risks,
behaviour and mitigation. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 2018;31.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2018.07.007.
[2] Ashley ST, Ashley WS. Flood fatalities in the United States. Journal of Applied Meteorology and Climatology 2008;47(3):805–18. https://doi.org/10.1175/2007JAMC1611.1.
[3] Diakakis M, Deligiannakis G. Vehicle-related ﬂood fatalities in Greece. Environmental
Hazards 2013;12(3–4):278–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/17477891.2013.832651.
[4] Kellar DMM, Schmidlin TW. Vehicle-related ﬂood deaths in the United States,
1995–2005. Journal of Flood Risk Management 2012;5(2):153–63. https://doi.org/
10.1111/j.1753-318X.2012.01136.x.
[5] Špitalar M, Gourley JJ, Lutoff C, Kirstetter PE, Brilly M, Carr N. Analysis of ﬂash ﬂood
parameters and human impacts in the US from 2006 to 2012. J Hydrol 2014;519(Part
A):863–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2014.07.004.
[6] Salvati P, Petrucci O, Rossi M, Bianchi C, Pasqua AA, Guzzetti F. Gender, age and circumstances analysis of ﬂood and landslide fatalities in Italy. Sci Total Environ 2018;
610–611:867–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scitotenv.2017.08.064.
[7] Sharif HO, Jackson T, Hossain M, Shaﬁque SBIN, Zane D. Motor vehicle-related ﬂood
fatalities in Texas, 1959–2008. Journal of Transportation Safety and Security 2010;2
(4):325–35. https://doi.org/10.1080/19439962.2010.506596.
[8] FitzGerald G, Du W, Jamal A, Clark M, Hou XY. Flood fatalities in contemporary
Australia (1997–2008). Emerg Med Australas 2010;22(2):180–6. https://doi.org/10.
1111/j.1742-6723.2010.01284.x.
[9] Ahmed MA, Haynes K, Taylor M. Vehicle-related ﬂood fatalities in Australia,
2001–2017; 2019 [Manuscript submitted for publication].
[10] Haynes K, Coates L, Leigh R, Handmer J, Whittaker J, Gissing A, et al. “Shelter-in-place”
vs. evacuation in ﬂash ﬂoods. Environmental Hazards 2009;8(4):291–303. https://doi.
org/10.3763/ehaz.2009.0022.
[11] NSW SES. Flood safety warning following 300 ﬂood rescues. Retrieved from: http://
www.ses.nsw.gov.au/news/76365/77179; 2016. [accessed 27 September 2016].
[12] Keech JJ, Smith SR, Peden AE, Hagger MS, Hamilton K. The lived experience of rescuing
people who have driven into ﬂoodwater: understanding challenges and identifying
areas for providing support. Health Promot J Austr 2018;30(2):252–7. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2017.12.013.
13

M.A. Ahmed et al.

Progress in Disaster Science 5 (2020) 100068

[42] Peden AE, Franklin RC, Leggat P. The ﬂood-related behaviour of river users in Australia.
PLOS Currents Disasters 2018, June 14. https://doi.org/10.1371/currents.dis.
89e243413a0625941387c8b9637e291b [Edition 1].
[43] Victoria State Emergency Service. 15 to ﬂoat: never drive on ﬂooded roads. Available
from: https://www.ses.vic.gov.au/-/15-to-ﬂoat-never-drive-on-ﬂooded-roa-1; 2017.
[44] Affum J, Giummarra G, Cheung H. Safety provisions for ﬂoodways over roads. (Research report No. AP-R481-15). Retrieved from Austroads website https://austroads.
com.au/publications/road-design/ap-r481-15/media/AP-R481-15_Safety_Provisions_
for_Floodways_Over_Roads.pdf; 2015.
[45] Bandura A. Self-efﬁcacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioural change. Advances in
Behaviour Research and Therapy 1978;1(4):139–61. https://doi.org/10.1016/01466402(78)90002-4.
[46] Rogers CT. Intuition: an imperative of command. Military Review 1994:38–50.
[47] Montag I, Comrey AL. Internality and externality as correlates of involvement in fatal
driving accidents. J Appl Psychol 1987;72(3):339–43. https://doi.org/10.1037/00219010.72.3.339.
[48] Bandura A. Self-efﬁcacy: the exercise of control. New York, NY: Freeman; 1997.
[49] Hamilton K, Warner LM, Schwarzer R. The role of self-efﬁcacy and friend support on adolescent vigorous physical activity. Health Educ Behav 2017;44(1):175–81. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1090198116648266.
[50] Zhou G, Gan Y, Hamilton K, Schwarzer R. The role of social support and self-efﬁcacy for
planning fruit and vegetable intake. J Nutr Educ Behav 2017;49(2):100–6. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jneb.2016.09.005.
[51] Zhou G, Sun C, Knoll N, Hamilton K, Schwarzer R. Self-efﬁcacy, planning and action
control in an oral self-care intervention. Health Educ Res 2015;30(4):671–81. https://
doi.org/10.1093/her/cyv032.
[52] Juhász J. Inﬂuence of different route-choice decision modes. Transportation Research
Procedia 2017;27:246–52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trpro.2017.12.058.
[53] Lindsey R, Daniel T, Gisches E, Rapoport A. Pre-trip information and route-choice decisions with stochastic travel conditions: theory. Transportation Research Part B: Methodological 2014;67:187–207. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2014.05.006.

[54] Yang J, Jiang G. Development of an enhanced route choice model based on cumulative
prospect theory. Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies 2014;47(Part
2):168–78. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.trc.2014.06.009.
[55] Aronson E, Wilson TD, Akert RM. Social psychology. . 7th edSaddle River, NJ: Pearson;
2010.
[56] Balke K, Higgins L, Chrysler S, Pesti G, Chaudhary N, Brydia R. Signing strategies for
low-water and ﬂood-prone highway crossings. (No. FHWA/TX-12/0 6262-1). Available
from: http://tti.tamu.edu/documents/0-6262-1.pdf; 2011.
[57] Higgins L, Balke K, Chrysler ST. Driver responses to signing treatments for ﬂooded
roads. Transportation Research Record 2012;2321(1):98–107. https://doi.org/10.
3141/2321-13.
[58] Dekker S, Cilliers P, Hofmeyr JH. The complexity of failure: implications of complexity
theory for safety investigations. Safety Science 2011;49(6):939–54. https://doi.org/10.
1016/j.ssci.2011.01.008.
[59] Safe Work Australia. Healthy, safe and productive working lives. Australian Work
Health and Safety Strategy 2012–2022; 2016 Available from: https://www.
safeworkaustralia.gov.au/about-us/australian-work-health-and-safety-strategy-20122022.
[60] Drobot SD, Benight C, Gruntfest EC. Risk factors for driving into ﬂooded roads. Environ
Hazard 2007;7(3):227–34. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envhaz.2007.07.003.
[61] Klein GA. Naturalistic decision making. Sources of power. How people make decisions.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1998.
[62] Taylor F, Archer F, Bird D, Paton D. Lessons from the Flood Safe program: Why people
do and do not prepare for ﬂoods. Paper presented at Floodplain Management Australia
Conference. Nowra, NSW, Australia.; 2016.
[63] Australian Government Geoscience Australia. Flood Terms, Geoscience Australia; 2014
Retrieved from: http://www.ga.gov.au.

14

